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People who design, use, and are aected by autonomous articially intelligent agents want to be able to trust such agents – that is,
to know that these agents will perform correctly, to understand the reasoning behind their actions, and to know how to use them
appropriately. Many techniques have been devised to assess and inuence human trust in articially intelligent agents. However, these
approaches are typically ad hoc, and have not been formally related to each other or to formal trust models. is paper presents a
survey of algorithmic assurances, i.e. programmed components of agent operation that are expressly designed to calibrate user trust in
articially intelligent agents. Algorithmic assurances are rst formally dened and classied from the perspective of formally modeled
human-articially intelligent agent trust relationships. Building on these denitions, a synthesis of research across communities
such as machine learning, human-computer interaction, robotics, e-commerce, and others reveals that assurance algorithms naturally
fall along a spectrum in terms of their impact on an agent’s core functionality, with seven notable classes ranging from integral
assurances (which impact an agent’s core functionality) to supplemental assurances (which have no direct eect on agent performance).
Common approaches within each of these classes are identied and discussed; benets and drawbacks of dierent approaches are also
investigated.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Trust plays a key role in interpersonal relationships. For example, a supervisor asks a subordinate to accomplish a
task based on several factors that indicate the subordinate can be trusted to do so. Likewise, when using something
∗HAL 9000, 2001 A Space Odyssey, full quote: “Just what do you think you’re doing, Dave? Dave, I really think I’m entitled to an answer to that question. I
know everything hasn’t been quite right with me, but I can assure you now, very condently, that it’s going to be all right again.”
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Fig. 1. Simple one-way trust relationship between a human user and an AIA: based on a user’s level of trust they take certain actions
(e.g. give AIA commands), which can lead to AIA actions and/or to assurances which aect user trust. Some ‘Task Oriented Behaviors’
can fall within the trust cycle, but the addition of a separate arrow is meant to encompass any actions are not strictly trust related.
like an autonomous vehicle, users must trust it appropriately in order to use it properly. With the rapid advancement
of articially intelligent technology and autonomous systems to do tasks that were previously assumed to be too
complicated for machines, there is now much discussion in public [33, 122, 139], business [10, 72, 129], and academic
seings [18, 38, 79] on how humans can trust said technology—although, the connection to trust is not always made
explicit from a technical standpoint. ose who discuss how to trust a specic technology are really referring to the
need to identify indicators of the appropriate level of trust. In other words, it is desirable to design capabilities and
methods into intelligent technology which help designers, users, and other stakeholders achieve appropriate levels of
trust in that technology. ese capabilities and methods are collectively referred to as assurances. e eld of formal
Validation and Verication (V&V) also uses the term assurances to refer to structured evidence that indicates whether
or not a system is functioning according to a priori design specications [17]. ese assurances will be referred to here
as ‘hard assurances’. Hard assurances are oen not relatable to users of systems or used to adjust levels of trust with a
user in real-time, but are used for certication and meeting certain qualications such as safety. is is in contrast to
‘so assurances’ that are meant to aect user trust and trust-related behaviors. In this paper, ‘assurances’ will refer to
so assurances only.
is survey investigates what assurances an Articially Intelligent Agent (AIA) can provide to a human user in order
to aect their trust. e colloquial denitions of ‘appropriate use’, ‘assurance’, ‘AIA’, and ‘trust’ should suce for
now to give the reader a general idea of the motivation; more formal denitions will be presented in Section 2. Many
researchers from dierent disciplines will potentially be interested in this work, which includes elds like machine
learning, articial intelligence, robotics and unmanned systems. More broadly, it includes any disciplines that deal in
some way with the interface between humans and technology; particularly those who are interested in working with,
trusting, interpreting, understanding, and/or regulating AIAs. As such, this paper cuts across multiple disciplines and
ties together concepts from several important research topics, such as trustworthy and explainable learning and AI,
ethical and transparent autonomy, and safety-/user-aware intelligent systems.
Figure 1 is a simple diagram of the trust cycle that exists between a human user and an AIA: user trust is aected by
assurances from the AIA, which in turn aects the user’s interaction with the AIA (e.g. to trust AIA with responsibilities,
or not). To fully understand and appreciate the importance of assurances, one must have a more formal understanding
of the components of the trust cycle. is paper provides an overview of the trust cycle elements, and then turns more
focused aention to assurances, surveying related research to date. From this survey, properties and classications of
assurances are dened, and considerations for further research are presented. Some of the novel contributions of this
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paper include: creating a detailed description and denition of assurances in general human-AIA relationships (based
in research from several, diverse, research communities); making a detailed breakdown of the dierent components of
assurances; and identifying design considerations for implementing assurances at dierent levels of integration within
the AIA. To this end, Section 2 provides denitions for each of the terms. Section 3 presents a more detailed version of
Figure 1. We classify existing work into seven categories of integration within the AIA; detailed denitions, discussion,
and examples of assurances from these categories help readers to understand how to apply assurances in their specic
applications. Finally, recommendations for future work are discussed in Section 4, and conclusions are presented in
Section 5.
2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
e notion of algorithms being used to create assurances for users is not new. However, the creation of these assurances
(for example in various engineering disciplines, soware, science, economics, and others) has historically been done
in an ad hoc manner. e need for designed assurances has grown considerably in recent years, as the advanced
capabilities of intelligent systems have become more dicult to comprehend and predict [34, 50, 86, 142]. Advanced
intelligent systems share capabilities with less-advanced counterparts, but generally possess much more delegated
responsibility, autonomous functionality, are employed in more uncertain environments, and are operated by a wider
demographic of users with dierent levels of understanding and technical skills. ese kinds of technologies are going
to be more prolic in number and inuence than any other previous technology known to date (consider the number of
people already using digital assistants, and content recommendation, as well as the likely impact that autonomous
vehicles are likely to have throughout the world). In this atmosphere the practice of designing assurances with lile
formal understanding is no longer viable; in short: the existing, informal, approach to assurance design is no longer
sucient due to the new challenges that advanced intelligent systems introduce.
When researchers discuss concepts like ‘comprehensible systems’, ‘interpretable learning’, ‘transparent systems’,
and ‘explainable AI’, they are really interested in making deliberately designed mechanisms to help designers and users
appropriately ‘trust’ autonomous and articially intelligent systems as they perform their tasks. For example, many
systems are designed to learn from extremely large amounts of data and are expected to regularly perform on never
before seen data—yet, it is rarely obvious if such data conforms to assumptions made at design time. Other systems
are designed to perform tasks that are too ‘dirty, dull, and dangerous’ for humans; the separation of users from these
tasks oen makes it dicult for them to understand whether these systems are performing as desired. e authors, for
instance, are interested in the design of unmanned robotic vehicle systems that operate in concert with remote human
operators in uncertain dynamic environments. Since operators will generally not be computer scientists or roboticists,
it is desirable for such systems to behave/communicate in ways that help operators properly use their abilities in
scenarios featuring unexpected or incomplete information, time-critical decisions, and risky outcomes [61, 126]. is
application is explained in more detail later in relation to Figure 1. ese issues also have relevance and analogues
in other applications of autonomous articial intelligence, robotics, machine learning and decision making/support
systems [7, 44, 105, 123], e.g. for scientic data analysis [37], public policy and medicine [64, 139] and cognitive
assistance [52].
Some elds have formally and explicitly considered trust between humans and specic forms of intelligent technology,
e.g. e-commerce, automation, and human-robot interaction. However, these research eorts have focused largely on
developing formal cognitive and psychological models of trust, rather than system behaviors or algorithms that designers
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Fig. 2. Set of possible AIA capabilities.
can exploit as assurances. Other elds that have explored assurance design only provide an informal connection to trust
and applications to other disciplines, so it is unknown how eective their developed assurances might be in practice, or
what principles ought to be considered for other kinds of autonomous and articially intelligent systems. is paper
surveys assurance metrics and methods across relevant application domains, with the goal of identifying common
principles, approaches and questions related to trust-based interaction. To begin with, denitions for the trust cycle
elements in Fig. 1 are given to formally ground the concept of assurances. An example application is then provided as a
means to compare/contrast technical ideas and implementations of algorithmic assurances throughout the survey in
Section 3.
2.1 Trust Cycle Definitions
Artificially Intelligent Agents. Herein the term Articially Intelligent Agent (AIA) will be used in order to encompass
a broad range of technologies that can be considered ‘autonomous’. An AIA is dened here as an agent that acts on
an internally or externally generated goal, and possesses, to some extent, at least one of the capabilities shown in
Fig. 2 [90, 103, 116]. While the term AIA can describe anything from a simple assembly line robot (which only possesses
a single capability from Figure 2) to the fabled HAL 9000 (who presumably possesses all of the AIA capabilities), this
denition underscores the idea that many assurances that exist for one set of (perhaps less capable) AIAs can be adapted
and generalized for use in other AIAs. In other words, this denition sets a scope for the bodies of research that are
likely to have investigated assurances and assurance principles, which can be extended to any ‘intelligent’ computing
system. e range of AIA capabilities also helps establish what kinds of assurances might be needed in future systems.
For example, assurances for an AIA that only carry out planning tasks will probably dier in design or implementation
from assurances for an AIA that only carry out perception tasks.
It should be noted that an AIA is assumed to operate with a degree of autonomy that is delegated by a user. at is,
an AIA is self-directed and self-sucient in its task to the extent that the user’s ‘intent frame’ (desired goals, plans,
constraints, stipulations and/or value statements) can be met by the AIA, regardless of how it actually accomplishes
this. Following Miller [98], this view of autonomy as a delegation relationship renes the need for ‘transparent AIAs’
by avoiding a contradiction of purpose that stems from an otherwise naive interpretation. From a naive standpoint, one
could argue that if AIAs are developed primarily to alleviate the burden of complex reasoning and other undesirable
workloads by removing users from the task at hand entirely, then this purpose is undercut by exposure and explanation
of sophisticated AIA inner workings to the user. However, if AIAs are subordinates that are delegated tasks by users
(who must still act as supervisors), the meaning of ‘transparency’ shis away from concern over how exactly an AIA
accomplishes a task, towards concern over whether or not an AIA can execute the task as per the user’s intent frame.
is delegation-based view naturally sets up the question of user trust in AIAs.
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User Trust. Trust is widely recognized as a critical part of intelligent multi-agent system dynamics—from those
involving only simple one-on-one interactions [83], to more complex ones describing markets and governments [41].
Because of interest spanning many disciplines, it is dicult (if not impossible) to write a succinct denition of trust that
would completely satisfy all interested parties. However, following [96], for the purposes of this work trust is dened
here as a psychological state in which an agent willingly and securely becomes vulnerable, or depends on, a trustee
(e.g., another person, institution, or an AIA), having taken into consideration the characteristics (e.g., benevolence,
integrity, competence) of the trustee.
is raises two important questions. Firstly, since trust is generally understood to exist between people, is it possible
for a human to enter into a trusting relationship with an AIA? at humans actually do develop trust in autonomous
machines has been conrmed several times [8, 32, 39, 67, 92, 102, 113, 119, 141]. Lacher et al. [78] also notes that
people trust AIAs for transportation systems at dierent levels (i.e. an engineer trusts dierently than an operator or
passenger). Secondly, in designing assurances that aect trust-based user behaviors, is it possible to know what drives
those behaviors and thus have some working model of user trust that can be mapped to AIAs? McKnight et al. [95] (and
later [94]) performed what is arguably the rst multi-disciplinary survey and unication of trust literature, which also
condensed it into a single typology consisting of four major related components. Adapted to AIAs, these are: Disposition
to Trust: the extent to which one displays a tendency to be willing to depend on AIAs in general across a broad spectrum
of situations and persons; Institution-Based Trust: the extent to which one believes that regulations are in place that are
conducive to situational success in an endeavor; Trusting Beliefs: the extent to which one believes that the AIA has
one or more characteristics benecial to oneself; Trusting Intentions: the extent to which one is willing to depend on,
or intends to depend on, the AIA even though one cannot control its every action. Dispositional Trust is generally
considered by psychologists, and deals with long-term psychological traits that develop in a person from childhood
(e.g. is someone pre-disposed to trusting technology?). Institutional Trust is generally studied by sociologists, and
represents the level to which a person trusts social/commercial structures. Finally, Interpersonal Trust (encompassing
both ‘trusting beliefs’, and ‘trusting intentions’) deals directly with one-on-one relationships and tends to uctuate most
quickly. Each of these trust components has sub-components dened in Figure 3, which were identied by compiling
many research studies across several disciplines. ese components are the principal drivers of user trust-related
behaviors, and are the general notional targets of AIA assurances.
Trust-Related Behaviors. Trust ultimately leads to some kind of meaningful behavior or action which reects the level
of an individual’s trust [84]. ese actions are called ‘trust-related behaviors’ (TRBs) [94]. In the case of a human-AIA
relationship per Fig. 1, some example TRBs could include the kinds of tasks the human user assigns to the AIA, accepting
and following through on a plan produced by the AIA, directing that a new plan be made, or switching o autonomous
capabilities altogether to teleoperate and perform tasks manually through a physical mechanism that the AIA otherwise
controls.
Trust is not a univariate quantity that can be objectively measured. Rather, it is a multidimensional phenomenon
whose ‘relative magnitudes and directions’ must be observed through changes in TRBs, or qualitative self-reports
gathered via surveys [102]. It thus comes as no surprise that TRBs are the more objective method of observation due
to the fact that people are not always consistent in their ratings, and may sincerely feel dierent levels of trust while
performing similar TRBs [36]. Parasuraman and Riley [106] were interested in understanding the use of automation
by humans, and dened terms to describe that use. Here it is proposed that, by extension, those terms also apply
to the behaviors of humans towards more advanced AIAs. Within this scope the denitions are as follows: Misuse:
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situation. It may not be immediately clear that 
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Very difficult to, in practice, to separate the dimensions of trust.  
Interrelationships are interdependent. Each user can be different. 
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Fig. 3. Notional assurance targets based on the component definitions of the main trust categories. While any of these could be
considered targets for assurances, the focus here is only on ‘Situational Normality’, ‘Competence’, and ‘Predictability’.
over-reliance on an AIA (which could manifest itself in a user’s unrealistically optimistic expectations of performance);
Disuse: u der-utilization of an AIA (e.g. a user turning o the AIA prematurely, or failing to use all of its capabilities);
Abuse: Inappropriate application of an AIA (where application in this case means the choice to deploy an AIA in a
certain context).
Following Fig. 1, AIA assurances should ideally be designed to steer the user away from misuse, disuse, or abuse of the
AIA, i.e. towards otherwise appropriate TRBs, by properly ‘calibrating’ assurances to suitably inuence user trust. is
point, to some extent, has been alluded to in [61, 81, 85, 101]. Other researchers who propose ‘calibration’ (or related
concepts) suggest calibrating trust as opposed to TRBs. Dzindolet et al. [36] found that providing system performance
feedback tended to increase users’ self-reported trust, even though resulting TRBs did not reect self-reported trust levels.
is highlights the danger of calibrating ‘trust’, as opposed to calibrating the TRBs. Whereas TRB calibration focuses
on concrete and measurable behaviors, trust calibration involves inuencing something that is directly immeasurable
and subject to individual biases when indirect measurements are aempted.
Assurances. An assurance is an AIA property or behavior that can either increase or decrease user trust. e
term ‘assurance’ is perhaps earliest used in the context of human-AIA relationships by Sheridan and Hennessy [120].
McKnight and Chervany [94] allude to this kind of feedback in e-commerce relationships as ‘Web Vendor Interventions’.
Corritore et al. [27] refer to assurances as ‘trust cues’ that can inuence how online users trust e-commerce vendors. Lee
and See [81] discuss ‘display characteristics’, which are methods by which an autonomous systems can communicate
information to an operator. More recently, Lillard et al. [85] provided a formal denition of assurances for autonomous
systems that is similar to the one used here.
Assurances can be classied in several dierent ways. One way to classify an assurance is by its Information Source:.
Assurances must be informed by some kind of information, whether that means real-time observation of TRBs in order
to have feedback, or well accepted concepts of cognitive science as guiding principles of design. Another approach is to
identify the Source/Target pair: In a human-AIA trust relationship, assurances link the AIA to the user. e user has
multi-dimensional trust in the AIA (see Fig. 3), and each AIA capability has multiple dimensions of ‘trustworthiness’.
In designing an assurance it is useful to explicitly identify the source capability, and the target trust dimension (i.e. a
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Fig. 4. Figure depicting the details of the human-AIA trust cycle.
certain assurance may have been designed as a ‘planning-competence’ assurance). An assurance can be considered
Component or Composite: A component assurance stems from one AIA capability to one trust dimension. A composite
assurance originates from multiple AIA capabilities to one trust dimension. Another consideration is whether the
assurance is Tutoring or Telling: An assurance that is dynamic to the dierent characteristics, and experience of users
is a ‘tutoring’ assurance. It is designed to help a user learn, over time, to trust appropriately. Conversely, all other
assurances are ‘telling’ in that they are static in regards to separate users. Mode of Expression: Assurances can also be
classied by their mode of expression. is includes the method and medium by which the assurance is expressed.
ere are many open questions regarding each of these categories; they are discussed further in Sec. 4, regarding future
work.
Level of Integration: Herein the ‘level of integration’ of assurances are surveyed. is is useful because it addresses a
natural consideration in the design process of AIAs; it also encapsulates well the key approaches that are in use. In this
context ‘integration’ refers to the level of eect the assurance has on the core functions of the AIA. As an example: an
assurance that, if missing, greatly eects the AIA functionality is considered integral to the AIA. Conversely, a missing
assurance that has no eect on the AIA functionality is not integral; we also call this ‘supplemental’. Between these
two extremes there is a natural continuum of integration on which we can classify the dierent algorithmic approaches
to designing assurances; we do so in Sec. 3.
Summary. Each of the elements of Fig. 1 has been dened in this Section (2.1). Figure 4 illustrates how these concepts
t together. In this document algorithmic assurances are surveyed through the lens of their ‘Level of Integration’; more
detailed discussion of the other elements are found in Sec. 4.
2.2 Recurring Example Application
To illustrate the assurances surveyed in the next section, a recurring example application based on the “VIP escort”
problem [60] is provided, motivated by the authors’ work in unmanned systems. An unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)
leads a small convoy through a road network monitored by friendly unaended ground sensors (UGS). e road network
also contains a hostile pursuer that the UGV is trying to evade while exiting the network as quickly as possible. e
pursuer’s location is unknown but can be estimated using intermient data from the UGS, which only sense portions of
the network and can produce false alarms. e UGV’s decision space involves selecting a sequence of actions (i.e. go
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Fig. 5. Application example of unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) in a road network, trying to evade a pursuer, using information from
unmanned ground sensors (UGSs), as well as information from a human supervisor.
straight, turn le, turn right, go back, stay in place). e UGS data, UGV motion, and pursuer behavior are all stochastic,
and the problems of decision making and sensing are strongly coupled: some trajectories through the network allow the
UGV to localize the pursuer before heading to the exit (but incur a high time penalty); other trajectories aord rapid exit
with high pursuer location uncertainty (increasing the risk of geing caught by the pursuer, which can take multiple
paths). A human supervisor monitors the UGV during operation. e supervisor does not have detailed knowledge
of the UGV – but can interrogate its actions, modify its decision making stance (‘aggressive’ vs. ‘conservative’), and
provide extra information about the pursuer (which is sporadically observed and follows an unknown course).
One way to construct an autonomous UGV path planner is to discretize time and spatial variables to build a partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) model [73] of the navigation task. e ideal POMDP solution is an optimal
UGV action selection policy that will, on average, maximize some utility function whose optimum value coincides with
desirable UGV behaviors (i.e. avoiding the pursuer and exiting quickly). POMDP policies can be calculated by any
number of sophisticated approximations that operate on probability distributions for the unknown pursuer state, which
in turn can be found via Bayesian sensor fusion [4]. is denes at least two AIA capabilities per Fig. 2: knowledge
representation and planning 1. e trust-cycle terms here can then be dened as follows relative to the supervisor
(user): AIA: the combined POMDP planning and data fusion agent, which must make decisions under uncertainty;
Trust: the supervisor’s willingness to rely on the UGV’s planning and data fusion algorithms when the safety of the VIP
being escorted is at stake; TRBs: supervisor’s behaviors that indicate trust (or lack thereof) in the UGV’s planner; these
include approving/rejecting the planner’s actions, or real-time adjustments of the data fusion output based on what the
supervisor receives from other intelligence sources; Assurances: properties and behaviors of the planning agent that
eect the supervisor’s trust, e.g. communication of the escape success probability, reports that unexpected UGS data
have been registered, or explanations of actions taken.
3 SURVEY OF ALGORITHMIC ASSURANCES
Whereas other researchers have noted the existence of assurances, we now directly consider the question: what, exactly,
are assurances, and how can they be practically designed into AIAs? is section surveys the related literature to
understand what algorithmic approaches can be used to design AIA assurances.
As discussed in Sec. 2.1 there are many dierent ways of classifying assurances. In evaluating dierent practical
approaches to designing assurances we have found that it is easiest to consider the ‘level of integration’ of the assurance
in the AIA. e level of integration of an assurance refers to the extent to which the core functionality of the AIA is
dependent on the existence of that assurance. Assurances naturally lie on a continuum between being totally integral
to the core function of the AIA, and not being integral at all but being generated by artifacts of the underlying task or
1consideration of lower-level UGV state estimation and control also leads to perception and motor control/execution.
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Fig. 6. The continuum of the level of integration of algorithmic assurances: to the le are those assurances which are integral to the
key functions of the AIA; on the right are assurances which are not integral to performance, i.e. ‘supplemental’ assurances.
AIA functionality. Figure 6 illustrates this continuum. For simplicity we will sometimes refer generally to assurances
as ‘integral’ or ‘supplemental’ based on whether they lie on the le or right side of the gure respectively 2. In the
literature we have identied seven main categories for designed assurances that span this continuum.
Practically, understanding the level of integration of dierent assurances is useful because doing so can indicate at
which point dierent assurances need to enter the design process. For example, an assurance that is integral to the AIA
must necessarily be considered from early on in the design process, whereas one that is supplemental can feasibly be
added much later. Also, assurances at dierent levels of integration have similarities in their aects; because of this
designers may make dierent decisions regarding assurance design based on their specications and goals.
While assurances cannot guarantee appropriate TRBs from a user, integral assurances are generally built with the aim
of intrinsically guaranteeing—as nearly as possible—certain eects on user trust and TRBs. In contrast, supplemental
assurances are typically weaker, and encourage appropriate TRBs; they rely much more on the uncertain relationships
with human users. Problems can arise, for example, when a designer expects supplemental assurances to have the same
eects on TRBs as those of integral assurances. is should generally not be expected. e remainder of this section is
dedicated to discussing each of the seven categories in more detail.
Survey Methodology. While theoretically a two-way trust model could be considered (i.e. in which the AIA also has
trust in the user), aention is restricted here to a one-way trust relationship that considers only how user trust (and
TRBs) evolves in response to assurances from the AIA.
It should be noted that it is practically impossible to perform a fully comprehensive survey of all AIA assurances, due
to the broad spectrum of possible assurances, and AIAs in general. As an example, one could rightly argue that control
engineers treat metrics like gain and phase margins as assurances for automatic feedback control systems, in much the
same way that machine learning practitioners treat training and test accuracy as assurances for learning algorithms—
and hence concepts related to robustness, stability, etc. for feedback control systems ought also be included in this
survey. Similar arguments exist for assurances developed in elds like econometrics, soware testing, aeronautical
engineering and many others. While assurances can, in theory, be applied in both the most simple ‘automatic’ systems
(like a thermostat), this survey will focus on assurances in more advanced AIAs that make decisions under uncertainty.
However, the admiedly narrow scope of this survey does not impede the development of fundamental insights and
principles in designing assurances.
2Note that, while Fig. 6 shows that the assurance classes occupy large spaces on the continuum, this is not referring to individual ‘component’ assurances.
An individual component assurance cannot be both integral and supplemental at the same time; it is located at a point on the continuum. is is not to
say that an AIA cannot, simultaneously, have many assurances distributed over the assurance integration continuum, but that these assurances must be
considered as separate.
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Initially, in order to nd applicable research, papers that formally addressed trust, and tried to create models of
it, were investigated. is was done with the aim of trying to understand how trust might be inuenced. Secondly,
literature regarding trust between humans and some form of machine entity was reviewed; this lead to research in
elds like e-commerce, automation, and human-robot interaction. ird, research on ‘interpretable’, ‘comprehensible’,
‘transparent’, ‘explainable’, and other similar types of learning and modeling methods were examined. Finally, with that
literature as a background, research disciplines investigating computational methods that can be useful as assurances,
but in which trust itself is not the main focus, were considered. is information was then used to construct an informed
denition and classication of assurances based on methods that are currently in use, or being investigated.
We now proceed to discuss each of the categories from Figure 6, starting from the most integral to the AIAs core
functionality and proceeding to the least integral.
3.1 Value Alignment
AIAs operate autonomously in delegated tasks, with the expectation that they behave according to users’ intent frames.
Optimization-based algorithms are arguably among the most common and direct approaches for accomplishing this.
e general idea is to dene a utility function that normatively governs the AIA’s abilities so that desirable behaviors
are elicited through maximization of the utility, i.e. such that the AIA behaves rationally in accordance with the user’s
intent frame. A utility function describes the ‘long-term desirability’ of taking certain actions in certain conditions, i.e.
beyond immediate benets or penalties, and should coherently reect user preferences about the state of the world
and AIA behaviors [116]. Such mapping of user intent frames to utility functions has two positive benets. Firstly,
it ensures that AIA behaviors can themselves be used as assurances: users will tend to trust AIA’s more if they are
‘well-behaved’ and acting in accordance with their desired intent than if they are not. Secondly, an AIA can generate
assurances via auxiliary behaviors that help ensure its utility function is aligned with the user’s intent frame. Since it is
practically quite challenging to encode user preferences and intent frames into utility functions, the process of value
alignment3 leads to many dierent algorithmic strategies for generating assurances.
Consider a generic decision-making problem where an AIA that must make choice a ∈ A given some task state
s ∈ S, with scalar utility function UA(a, s). If a user’s true utility is represented by scalar function UH (a, s), then in the
ideal situation the AIA seeks the optimal decision a∗ ∈ A such that, for any s ∈ S,
a∗ = arg max
A
UA(a, s) = arg maxA UH (a, s).
Hence, value alignment tries to minimize the dierence between the utilities of the AIA and the user. When the utility
of the robot UA(a, s) and the human UH (a, s) are approximately equivalent (within some tolerance) then the values
of the AIA are aligned with those of the human. An AIA with aligned values will be considered by users to be more
predictable (and thus more competent), because the AIA will be more likely to act in desirable ways. Bostrom [14]
provides a well-known example of an AIA whose value is not aligned: an autonomous robot is designed, and deployed,
with the intent that it make paper clips. To maximizeUA(s,a), the robot then decides to take over the world in order
to maximize its resources and ability to make more paper clips. To reasonable human users, this was clearly not the
intended behavior; the utilities that the robot used for making decisions did not match those that the human must have
had. erefore the robot’s resulting behavior was intrinsically an assurance that reduced trust. On the other hand, if the
robot were to try to learn from its mistakes and improve (i.e. make UA(s,a) closer to Uh (s,a)) that could be perceived
3Value alignment is more commonly known as ‘AI Alignment’ in AI research [12, 148].
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as an assurance that increases trust—the robot can be ‘forgiven’ for making honest mistakes in trying to optimize an
ill-posed/under-specied utility function, as long as it is able to recognize and remedy this.
3.1.1 Common Approaches: ere are two algorithmic strategies for value alignment: (i) indirect: approximate
UH (a, s) explicitly via UA(a, s), and then use this approximation to nd a∗; (ii) direct: identify a∗ = arg maxUH (a, s)
directly via the use of optimal state-action value functions Q∗(s,a) (which give the utility to be gained if the AIA
were to proceed optimally starting from s , regardless of its past states or actions). ese strategies closely resemble
techniques used for reinforcement learning problems and their variants (especially inverse reinforcement learning);
not surprisingly, most value alignment techniques are rooted in this domain. Value alignment research tends to focus
on several dierent issues [7, 47]; some of the more directly applicable topics and associated methods that point to
useful assurance strategies are described below. e solutions to these problems are assurances because they aord
opportunities for users to beer understand the actual intentions and goals of the AIA, as well as understand how the
AIA actually interprets intent frames.
Reward Hacking and Human-Guided Learning. e reward hacking problem deals with avoiding and removing
unintended consequences in AIA behaviors that arise from imperfections in the specication ofUA(s,a) (as in the paper
clip-making robot example above). e most popular solution strategies use some form of oine supervisory human
guidance or training data feedback in the utility function learning process. is approach recognizes the intrinsic
diculty of mapping user preferences to a single scalar utility UH (s,a) for complex tasks, and leverages sophisticated
machine learning and reasoning strategies to identify relevant preferences withinUA(s,a) or Q∗(s,a), depending on the
kinds of tasks considered. For instance, one-shot/non-sequential decision-making tasks like image recognition or object
perception do not necessarily have dynamical state considerations, but may require potential expansion of the action
space for sensible labeling of new object categories.
In the context of sequential decision making problems, Hadeld-Menell et al. [56], Hadeld-Menell et al. [55], and
Huang et al. [59] all consider variations of the ‘inverse reward design’ problem using inverse reinforcement learning
techniques. In these works, discounted cumulative rewards are used to model utility functions UA(s,a) and UH (s,a),
where the actual reward factors contributing toUH (s,a) are unknown but can be inferred from user-generated contextual
information at design time. Specically, [56] notes that reward factors provided by users in limited training contexts
serve as ‘noisy evidence of intent’. Hence, to avoid situations where an AIA trainee demonstrates desirable behaviors
in specic training scenarios but later demonstrates undesirable behaviors in novel scenarios, the AIA must be able
to reason over the uncertainty in the user’s intent in order to fully capture the context in which it was trained. In a
dierent task seing, Freitas [40] compared two approaches to discovering ‘interesting’ knowledge from large data
sets, based on the idea that human users require assistance from complex systems in order to nd useful paerns and
other interesting insights. He mentions ‘user-driven’ methods that involve a user suggesting interesting templates
or providing general impressions in the form of IF-THEN rules. A subsequent comparison to dierent ‘data-driven’
methods suggests that the laer are not very eective in practice. Having said that, user-driven approaches may not
fare any beer when compared over many users, as each user will likely have dierent preferences. Other scaled up
user-driven approaches, e.g. based on crowd-sourcing Chang et al. [20], can also achieve beer accuracy for labeling
tasks while also exploring new or ambiguous classes that can be ignored with traditional approaches (especially if
training data sets are biased or very limited). Chang et al. [20] also consider a similar, scaled up, ‘user-driven’ approach
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called ‘Revolt’ that crowd-sources the labeling of images. It is able to aain high accuracy labeling, while also exploring
new or ambiguous classes that might be ignored with traditional approaches.
Some other methods for designing, learning and eliciting appropriate utility functions are also discussed in [29, 44, 55].
Despite the dierences in AIA application contexts, these methods all provide the user with beer context for what
should be known by system, and for how well it can interpolate/extrapolate. ese processes allow users to rene their
own intent in complex seings, e.g. to reveal or resolve subtle low-level inconsistencies in desired task requirements
that would otherwise lead a rational AIA to undesirable behaviors.
Safe learning and correct-by-construction synthesis: In many applications,UH (s,a) must be safely approximated when
certain combinations of (s,a) lead to irreversibly bad consequences. Hence, as AIAs try to learn what a user’s utility
is, they must do so in a safe manner. For instance, humans do not learn about the dangers of heights from falling o
of skyscrapers. Instead we have to do so cautiously over time, and extrapolate from much less drastic experience (i.e.
tripping on a curb). Safe reinforcement learning (safe RL) methods oer formal strategies and assurances for AIAs
to learn in similar ways. Safe RL has been dened as the process of avoiding “unintended and harmful behavior that
[emerges] from machine learning systems” [7]. Two ways to approach safe RL are: (i) modication of the optimality
criterion with a safety factor, and (ii) modication of the exploration process through the incorporation of external
knowledge [44].
For example, Lipton et al. [87] design an ‘intrinsic fear’ RL approach that uses a deep Q-network and a ‘supervised
danger model’. e danger model stores the likelihood of entering a catastrophe state within a ‘short number of steps’.
is model can be learned by detecting catastrophes through experience and can be improved over time. Curran et al.
[28], in a more specic application, asks how a robot can learn when a task is too risky, and then avoid those situations,
or ask for help. Similarly, Kahn et al. [65] use Bayesian Deep Neural Nets (using bootstrapping and dropout) to learn
about the probability (with uncertainty) of an autonomous vehicle colliding in an environment given its current state,
observations, and sequence of controls. Using this model they formulate a ‘velocity-dependent collision cost’ that is
used for model-based reinforcement learning. With this approach the vehicle naturally proceeds slowly when there is
an elevated risk of collision. is ‘safety-aware’ behavior provides an assurance signal to the user.
Aside from purely learning-based approaches, we can also consider Validation and Verication (V&V) methods. Not all
practitioners are aware that V&V techniques can generate so assurances for users. is is because V&V typically refers
to the use of formal methods to guarantee the behavior of a system within some set of specications, which are handed
down by a certication authority as requirements to system designers to generate ‘hard assurances’ (formal proofs of
the functionality of the system). Although these ‘hard assurances’ are not primarily designed for user consumption, they
could in principle be exposed to and interpreted for users in certain contexts. A prime example is given by Raman et al.
[110], who developed a formal way for non-expert users to provide structured natural language task specications to a
robot, such that a ‘correct-by-construction’ controller will be built if the specication is valid. Otherwise, the robot will
provide an explanation about which specication(s) are unrealizable/inconsistent and will cause failure. In the context
of a practical self-driving car application, Ghosh et al. [45] presents a framework called Trusted Machine Learning
(TML) for learning models from dynamically generated data that t pre-determined ‘trustworthiness’ constraints. ese
approaches are promising in that they not only present a way to communicate when and why specied tasks cannot be
performed or certain actions cannot be taken, but also provide positive assurances in the form of guaranteed, formally
veried, AIA processes for performing desired tasks (plans, models, etc.). While this directly addresses the competence
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and predictability components of AIA trust, the ‘raw’ expression of these assurances does not formally account for
eects on user trust or TRBs in formulating explanations.
Robustness to context shis. How can an AIA determine when the basis and provenance of its approximation to
UH (s,a) or Q∗(s,a) is no longer valid for a particular task? is problem has aracted much recent aention in the
learning literature under the guise of ‘nonstationary’ learning. Nonstationarity refers to the complex challenge of
training a model based on data from one distribution D while taking into account that the test distribution D ′ will likely
shi through time [109]. For instance, in the context of classication problems, Sugiyama et al. [123] propose using
importance sampling Monte Carlo to formally detect events related to ‘covariate shi’ (training and test input data
follow dierent distributions) and ‘class-balance change’ (where the class-prior probabilities are dierent in training
and test phases, but where there is no covariate shi). Similarly, Charikar et al. [21] address learning from ‘untrusted’
data, which could be subject to adversarial aack or unknown nonstationarity.
ese methods can be more generally adapted and developed beyond learning tasks, in order to evaluate the
sensitivity of as-designed AIA’s capabilities to possible changes in task context not captured/considered at design time
(an example of coping with ‘unknown unknowns’). If the sensitivities imply a signicant deviation in UA(s,a) or a∗
from expected values (i.e. from user intent frame as initially understood), or indicate the presence of new (s,a) pairs
that are not accounted for byU (s,a) (e.g. test data that is very far from the training set), then the AIA can inform the
user accordingly and thus possibly opt out of performing tasks that are now potentially ‘out of scope’. is provides
direct low-level behavioral assurances about changes in predictability, competence, and situation normality, though
these may not be immediately understood by non-expert users.
3.1.2 Grounding Example: In the case of the ‘VIP Escort’ problem (described in Section 2.2), value alignment might
be used as an assurance in the following way, starting with the assumptions that:
• e UGV has just begun an aempt to escape the road-network
• e UGV uses safe RL to learn its escape policy
• e operator is able to observe the UGV during its entire escape aempt
e operator has used several dierent UGVs for similar tasks. is newer model uses ‘safe RL’ to learn its policy.
When observing the UGV’s aempt at escape the operator notices a dierence in how the UGV operates. Whereas the
older UGV models would sometimes do risky things, this UGV seems to navigate dangerous situations much beer.
Discussion of Example: In this case, safe RL enabled the UGV to treat situations that an operator might classify as
‘dangerous’ with more care. With this integral capability the UGV assures the operator that it is more competent.
3.2 Interpretable Models and Processes
Another way to provide assurances about AIA conformance to user intent frames is to expose the models and algorithmic
processes governing its actions directly to the user. If these models and processes also happen to be easy for users
to interpret, then the user can (ideally) acquire a well-formed and highly predictive ‘theory of mind’ for the AIA’s
behavior, with lile or no eort . Doshi-Velez and Kim [34] give an argument for why interpretability is critical in
AIA systems since interpretability ‘is used to conrm other important desiderata of [machine learning] systems’.
Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, ‘interpretability’ and the aendant desiderata still elude formal universally accepted
denitions. ey also use the words ‘interpretable’ and ‘explainable’ interchangeably. In contrast, we treat them as
distinct descriptors. We discuss models that are inherently interpretable here, and models that can be understood by
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explanation in Section 3.5.1. e dierence is that interpretability (in our view) implies that the actual process/model
used by an AIA is self-explanatory, whereas explainable models can be made interpretable by post hoc operations but
do not necessarily explain the actual model/process used by an AIA. Being able to interpret the actual model/process
used by an AIA helps human users to more appropriately understand their behaviors, and thus exhibit appropriate
TRBs in turn. is approach to assurance also captures broader AIA processes and models that rely on rules, heuristics,
etc., rather than just those that rely on optimization of some particular utility.
3.2.1 Common Approaches: Two main approaches to designing interpretable AIA models and processes are consid-
ered here. e rst is to assess an existing set of candidate models/processes in order to evaluate their interpretability in
the context of a particular task, and then select the best candidate. is is typically done with certain classes of models
or solution processes, e.g. whether to use decision trees vs. decision tables for a given planning task. e second is to
synthesize interpretable models/processes by leveraging human designer input during the model/solution-building process.
e rst approach requires pre-dened measures of interpretability, and thus some mechanism for capturing ability to
gain insights into competence, predictability, and situation normality. is also presupposes that the candidates are
inherently interpretable along these lines to begin with, which may rule out methods that perform well on certain tasks.
e second approach allows designers to apply domain knowledge to determine metrics for interpretability, although
this can lead to solutions that do not perform as well as those that are less interpretable.
What is the assurance mechanism that potentially leads to proper TRBs in either approach? Essentially, allowing
the user to access and examine an interpretable model/process also allows them to simultaneously assess competency,
predictability, and situational normality components of trust. If the models/processes are perfectly interpretable, then a
user could understand exactly how the AIA would perform its task (i.e. down to a mechanical/programmatic level). is
gives the user a ‘mental model’ of what the AIA would consider to be situational normality and how AIA would respond
in dierent situations (predictability and competence). e caveat here is that incorrect TRBs may arise if the user
mis-interprets or only understands part of the model/process. is is a signicant risk in highly complex or specialized
problems, where users may not actually have sucient training or expertise. is also poses concerns for how/when
users can access interpretable AIA components. Unlike value alignment (where user accesses assurances only through
behavior of AIA itself), the user has more freedom in deciding when and how to ‘peek under the hood’. is relates to
assurances based on information visualization discussed later, except that here the information being given to the user
are the actual AIA algorithms themselves, as opposed to byproducts or aer eects of those algorithms.
Assessing Interpretability: Van Belle and Lisboa [135] suggested three ways to ascertain the level of interpretability
and potential utility of learned models (compare to categories proposed by Lipton [86]): 1) Map them to domain
knowledge; 2) Ensure safe operation across the full operational range of model inputs; and 3) Assess whether important
non-linear eects are accurately accounted for. is work identies certain strengths and weaknesses of dierent
techniques, but ultimately concludes that no method is clearly best in all situations. Along similar lines, Huysmans
et al. [62] compared decision trees, decision tables, propositional if-then rules, and oblique rule sets to understand
which set of methods is ‘most interpretable’. It was experimentally determined that decision trees and tables tend to
be easier to interpret, but it is noted that each method could perform beer than others in dierent applications. For
example decision trees and tables are typically beer suited for answering a symbolic question (which requires a local
understanding of a model) like: how does the model classify observation X ’?. is is in contrast to a spatial question
(which requires a global understanding of the model) like: is it correct that applicants with a high income are more likely
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to be accepted than applicants with a low income? Having quantied the interpretability of a model given dierent
classes of problems, and dierent requirements of users the appropriate model can then be selected during design to t
the needs of a specic application.
Interpretable Model Synthesis: Ruping [115] asks how classication results and the accuracy-interpretability trade-o
can be made more transparent to those who design and use classiers. He explores one approach by combining simpler
global models with more complex local models that are built around learning results (Oe [105] and Ribeiro et al. [111]
implement similar ideas as well). Figure 7 illustrates this idea. e explanation of Fig. 7 could be something like: ‘e
classication boundary is generally a horizontal line. However, for a small region on the right hand side the boundary
is shaped roughly as an inverse quadratic starting from the horizontal line’.
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Fig. 7. Example of simple global interpretable learning model on the le, and on the right a more complex locally interpretable
learning model that can be used when more precise understanding of a specific decision made by the learner is required.
Considerable eort has also gone into endowing ‘grey box’ and ‘black box’ models with interpretable features. For
instance, Abdollahi and Nasraoui [1] investigate making collaborative ltering models more interpretable by using a
conditional restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM). Ridgeway et al. [112] use ‘weight of evidence’ (WoE) as a boosting
method that is more amenable to interpretation, and show that the performance WoE is on par with AdaBoost. Choi
et al. [23] construct a recursive aention neural network to remove recurrence on the hidden state vector, and instead
add recurrence on the visits of patients to doctors, as well as on dierent diagnoses during those visits. In this way the
model is able to predict possible diagnoses in time, and a visualization can be that that indicates the critical visits and
diagnoses that lead to that prediction.
Learning of human-understandable representations for data and feature selection also provides another avenue for
developing assurances [11, 53]. For instance, Mikolov et al. [97] studied how to represent words and phrases in a vector
space for natural language text learning; this enables simple vector operations for understanding word sense similarity
and relative relationships learned from text corpora. For example, the vector addition operation airlines+German
yields similar entries that include Luhansa. Such representations encode knowledge that can be easily checked and
understood by humans, and thus implicitly facilitate interaction and calibration of trust (see [57] for another example).
e problem of discovering human understandable features and representations in more general seings still remains
an open question. Currently, the main question for representation learning is how to nd the ‘best representations’ for
a particular application—not necessarily the representations and features that are ‘most humanly understandable’. is
is not surprising, since human-understandable representations and features are not necessarily optimal for the criteria
that AIAs are typically designed against.
Contrary to the belief that interpretable models are necessarily worse performing than their less interpretable
counterparts, several researchers have shown that this is not always the case (at least in the context of machine learning).
However, the real trade-o is the amount of work that goes in to craing the interpretable model from the start; these
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methods are oen custom designed for certain tasks and are not easily transferable to other problems. Because of this,
AIA designers must strike a balance between interpretable models, explainable models, and black-box models.
Park et al. [107] point out that real interpretability in complex tasks still requires expert knowledge to make sense of
complicated features; in essence: people are needed at both ends of interpretable models. For instance, Jovanovic et al.
[64] use ‘Tree-Lasso’ (TL) logistic regression with domain knowledge (i.e. medical diagnostic codes) to group similar
conditions, and then use TL regression again on that information to develop a sparser model. Zycinski et al. [152]
also use domain knowledge to structure a data matrix before feature selection and classication. See also Khoa et al.
[71], Zhang et al. [150] for other related examples. is kind of approach is also illustrated by those who use those who
use ‘theory guided data science’ (TGDS [37, 68]). As one example Morrison et al. [100] address the situation where
an imperfect analytical model is available for chemical reaction kinetics: the theoretical reaction equations are well
known, but a ‘stochastic operator’ is added on top of this to account for uncertainties and modeling errors. In adopting
this approach the model becomes interpretable (to experts).
3.2.2 Grounding Example: In the case of the ‘VIP Escort’ problem (described in Section 2.2), interpretable models
might be used as an assurance in the following way, starting with the assumptions that:
• e UGV has just begun an aempt to escape the road-network
• e UGV is using a decision-tree for selecting dierent movements
• e operator is able to view the decision-tree model the UGV is using
While the operator is monitoring the progress of the UGV in its aempt to escape the road-network they are able to
consult the decision-tree model. In this case the operator chose to consult the table when they saw the UGV make an
unexpected turn at a given intersection. e operator identied the conditions that led to the decision and found that
the UGV was not well equipped to execute the decision the operator thought was best.
Discussion of Example: In this example the use of a decision-tree as a model enabled the operator to investigate
unexpected behavior. During inspection they identied certain conditions that led to a decision, and they found that
the UGV was not competent to perform what the operator thought was a beer decision. Because of this the operator
beer understood the decision the UGV made, and will have a more appropriate level of trust in future interaction.
3.3 Human-Like Behavior
Since humans are accustomed to forming and evaluating trusting relationships with each other, imitation of human-
human communication and interactive behaviors provides yet another avenue for developing AIA assurance strategies.
Support for this idea is given by Tripp et al. [134], who compared human trust in other humans against human trust in
intelligent interactive technology. ey found that, as the technology becomes more ‘human-like’, self-reported levels
of trust in technology become more similar to levels of trust in other humans.
de Visser et al. [30] also specically discusses dierent methods by which AIAs can be more human-like in order
to ‘repair trust’ with users (here, trust repair is roughly analogous to assurances, but focuses on re-building trust
aer it is lost). Among several other possibilities, they suggest that an AIA might repair trust by anthropomorphizing
(responding using a human communication channel), or by explaining its actions in the same way a person would.
Such human-like behavior opens the door for AIAs to exhibit ‘non-rationally motivated’ behaviors (i.e. suboptimal,
as opposed to irrational actions), if these conform to social norms or other psychological cues that provide useful
assurances about predictability (e.g. a robot arm that executes legible motions), competency (e.g. a robot which slowly
Manuscript submied to ACM
“Dave. . . I can assure you . . . that it’s going to be all right . . . ” 17
backs away from unfamiliar or potentially dangerous objects), or situation normality (e.g. a robot car that apparently
rubbernecks near an unfamiliar scene on the road).
3.3.1 Common Approaches. Generally, we do not have algorithms that describe how humans interact with each
other (yet), and must sele for heuristics or best aempts to create human-like behavior via algorithms. From a high
level, researchers have addressed these: nonverbal communication, and mannerisms.
Nonverbal Communication: Nonverbal communication can take many dierent forms. One popular approach is to
use motion or gestures. Szar et al. [127] investigated how to enable ‘Assisted Free Flyer’ robots (quad-copters that
are made to interact with humans in close spaces) to communicate by using gestures. In doing so they use ‘motion
primitives’ (a basic vocabulary of movements) that were inspired by basic ‘character animation’ principles [136]. In
their evaluations of these primitives with human participants in the presence of free yers, they found that human
users signicantly found the free yers to be more natural, and felt safer around them. Later Szar et al. [128] also
experimentally showed the eectiveness of using illuminated ‘turn signals’ and pairs of human-like ‘eyes’ that shied
with free yer heading (much as human eyes do when people walk in a crowd) to help users more easily interpret the
vehicle’s intended movements and actions. ese works provide strong support for ‘commonsense communication’
assurances aimed at predictability in physical user-AIA interactions (even if indicators like ‘moving eyes’ do not actually
see anything). Likewise, Dragan and Srinivasa [35] investigate ‘legible motion planning’, i.e. planned robotic physical
movements and gestures that, by themselves, convey intended actions and goals. For example, a table-seing robot
may grasp a plate on both sides from the top using two end eectors if it intends to shi the position of the plate along
the table surface, whereas it may grasp the same plate with only one hand from the side if it intends to pull away and
remove the plate from the table. Legible motion is used by humans working in close proximity, and so can also be
useful and important for situations in which a physically embodied AIA and person are collaboratively working in
close proximity to each other. Similarly, in more recent work Kwon et al. [76] investigates calculating trajectories that
convey ‘incapability’, which is what the AIA is trying to do, and why it is unable to do so. See also [3] for related work.
Mannerisms: Humans are naturally inclined to leverage social interaction cues and adherence to/violation of social
norms as evidence for assessing the trustworthiness of other humans in everyday interactions. AIAs can leverage these
inclinations to provide simultaneous assurances of their competence, predictability, and situation normality. Consider,
for instance, a recent ‘mini-Turing Test’ example from the popular media: at Google/IO 2018, Google Duplex [46] was
introduced through a demo where it placed a phone call to make a reservation. An o-remarked feature of this demo
is the great dicultly (if not near impossibility) of detecting whether or not the Duplex voice is human – down to
the words spoken, tone of voice, and speech mannerisms (which included ‘um. . . ’, pauses, and shortened sentences).
e human on the other end of the call was none the wiser, and trusted that they were in fact speaking to a regular
human customer – when in fact they were speaking in a completely natural manner to the product of a recurrent neural
network (RNN) trained on anonymized phone conversation data.
More formally, Salem et al. [119] investigated the eects of autonomous task errors, task types, and ‘system personality’
on cooperation and trust for humans who observed a domestic robot performing house tasks, such that the robot
implicitly showed competence by its mannerisms and successes/failures during tasks. In this case, the mannerisms and
competency of the robot were completely under control and hard-coded into the system. Regardless, when participants
were asked to cooperate with the robot on certain other tasks, the strange/unexpected operation of the robot was found
to inuence the self-reported trust levels of the participants.
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Wu et al. [145] investigated how a person’s decisions in a coin entrustment game are aected by their belief in
whether they are competing against an AIA or another human player (which, unbeknownst to participants, was in
fact an AI with some programmed human-like idiosyncrasies, e.g. variable wait times between turns). Trust in this
context was measured directly by the number of coins a participant was willing to lose by puing them at risk to the
other player. e experiment found that the participants trusted the AI opponent more than they trusted the ‘human’
opponent; the authors suggest that this may be due to the perception that the AI opponent did not have feelings and
operated in a more predictable and consistent ‘machine-like’ way. Given that the ‘human’ was an AI as well, this
experiment illustrates that ‘machine-like’ behavioral consistency can lead to implicit positive eects the trust of the
participant in certain contexts.
3.3.2 Grounding Example: In the case of the ‘VIP Escort’ problem (described in Section 2.2), human-like behavior
might be used as an assurance in the following way, starting with the assumptions that:
• e UGV is about to begin an aempt at escaping the road-network
• e operator can observe all the actions of the UGV via video feeds at intersections
• e UGV has been designed with the ability to use gestures in order to indicate its ‘incapability’ as in [76]
As the UGV begins the escort problem, the human supervisor is monitoring progress. When the UGV reaches a
certain intersection of the road network the supervisor expects the UGV to take a path A, but it does not. However,
before choosing to take path B, the UGV made a movement that, to the operator, indicated that it considered aempting
to traverse A. Due to the aempt the supervisor was able to surmise that the UGV wanted to take that path but couldn’t
due to some limitation.
Discussion of Example: In this case the UGV is able to maintain appropriate trust of the supervisor because the
supervisor was able to interpret the ‘gesture’ that UGV was using. is highlights the assuring eects that human-like
communication/behaviors can have on users.
3.4 User Interaction
Despite the o-repeated sentiment that advanced AIAs will ‘soon’ be able to operate with lile or no human involvement,
those who have more practical experience with AIAs are much more skeptical of this claim, and point out that it is
highly unrealistic to expect AIAs to ever function ‘perfectly out of the box’ with true total autonomy [15]. A popular
and promising avenue for surmounting the inevitable shortcomings of AIAs, and thus engendering trust in users,
has therefore been to put the users ‘in-the-loop’ (or ‘on-the-loop’) as collaborative partners who can augment (or
supervise) AIA capabilities. In formulating algorithms for AIA capabilities that leverage user inputs, the user becomes
analogous to a supervisor working alongside those they supervise; in doing so they are able to provide useful feedback in
real-time, lend their expertise, and beer appreciate the decisions and outcomes of the team’s work. Such collaborative
problem solving not only gives users a chance to directly assess AIA competence and predictability through experience
(assurances), but also provides a way for users to continuously engage AIAs in accordance with their actual capabilities
(appropriate TRBs). Note that user interaction techniques are not the same as user assessment techniques discussed
later, since user assessment techniques do not involve fundamentally changing AIA algorithms or capabilities to exploit
user interaction.
3.4.1 Common Approaches: Users can be exploited to provide or augment any of the AIA capabilities in Fig. 2 on
many dierent levels. At one extreme, a user might fully replace or augment a subset of core AIA capabilities, e.g. to
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act as a high-level ‘sensor’ and planner for an autonomous robot in a navigation task [69]. On the other extreme, the
human might have a very weak involvement in the core perception functionality of an AIA, e.g. to validate the labeling
of image data. Since the literature in this area is quite vast and ongoing research quite active, we focus here, for the sake
of brevity, only on a few typical methods from the human-robot interaction literature where the AIA (an autonomous
robot) engages the user as an additional ‘sensor’/perception agent or ‘controller’/planning agent. e references cited
in these works also point to a host of other related and relevant techniques, which in turn can (and have) been adapted
to other AIA capabilities such as learning, reasoning, knowledge representation, etc.
Sweet and Ahmed [125] investigate the use of humans as ‘so’ sensors for target localization tasks, whereby
semantic natural language observations (‘Target is by the bridge’, ‘Nothing in the street’) can be directly combined with
conventional ‘hard’ robot sensor data (from cameras, lidar, sonar, etc.) in order to improve and augment the robot’s
Bayesian state estimation algorithms. ey apply their approach in a scenario called ‘Cops and Robots’ where a single
‘cop’ robot tries to locate mobile ‘robber’ robots in a semantically rich indoor environment. In this case the human acts
as a ‘deputy’ that remotely interacts with the system. e human can see security camera footage of the building in
which the cop is searching, and can oer natural language feedback to the cop robot when appropriate. If the human
oers information, it can be fused into the cop robot’s estimation model, but in the meantime the cop robot operates
autonomously to plan its motion without human assistance. Along similar lines, Kaupp and Makarenko [69] empirically
identify the appropriate level of autonomy for a robotic navigation system while taking into account the amount of
sensory interaction required by a human supervisor. In this case the robot has sensors of its own, but can also ask for
user input when the value of information (VOI) is high enough (i.e. is it worth asking a human sensor for information
given that there is a cost?); they dene the threshold VOI by performing human trials before deployment of the system
in order to optimize the involvement of the human user.
Tellex et al. [130] consider planning algorithms that are augmented by human natural language commands for an
autonomous assembly robot that can detect when it has failures (conditions that don’t match expectations based on
internal models). When this occurs the robot requests help from the human user to resolve the problem. In this way the
human and robot are dependent on each other to accomplish a task. Since the user knows that, if needed, the robot will
ask for help, they can more appropriately trust that unknown problems won’t occur without them being informed.
Freedy et al. [39] studied performance measures for mixed-initiative human-autonomous robot teams (where users and
robots share planning and decision authority), and examined the extent to which such teams can only be successful if
“humans know how to appropriately trust and hence appropriately rely on the automation”. ey explore this idea by
using a tactical reconnaissance scenario where human participants supervised an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)
platoon with three levels of autonomous targeting/ring capability (low, medium, high); these levels were dependent
on the experimental conditions. e operator needed to monitor the UGV in case it couldn’t perform as desired; in such
cases the operator could intervene to resolve the problem. Operators were trained to recognize signs of task failure, and
to only intervene if they thought the mission completion time would suer.
3.4.2 Grounding Example: In the case of the ‘VIP Escort’ problem (described in Section 2.2), user interaction might
be used as an assurance in the following way, starting with the assumptions that:
• e UGV has just begun an aempt to escape the road-network
• An interface system exists by which the operator can receive and provide information to the UGV
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e UGV is capable of operating autonomously, but also can benet by asking for assistance or information when
necessary, e.g. using a natural language interface for augmented planning and sensor fusion. In this way the functionality
of the UGV can be greatly improved via interaction with the user. As the user interfaces with the UGV and is able to
provide feedback and information about the best known location of the pursuer based on information unavailable to
the UGV they have more trust in the competence, predictability, and situational normality of the UGV.
Discussion of Example: In this scenario the user is more immersed in the functioning of the UGV. Not only are
they able to respond to queries from the UGV, but they can also provide direct observations as well. Subsequently, the
user feels more immersed in the functioning of the UGV and is more cognizant of appropriate TRBs.
3.5 AIA Self-Assessment
e techniques of previous sections generally tend to provide integral assurances (i.e. designed as part of core
functionality of AIA capabilities) that are artifacts of interactive algorithms designed to compensate for shortcomings
in AIA capabilities. is section focuses on ‘introspective’ assurances that inform users of competency limits and
boundaries of AIA capabilities without requiring user interaction, and that can generally be separated from core AIA
functionality (i.e. without requiring modication of core, underlying, AIA design). ese self-assessments can provide
users with insights regarding either or both of the following related issues: (i) what information and tasks are actually
within the AIA’s reach?, and (ii) what is required by the AIA to actually do its assigned task? In contrast to user
interaction techniques: the analogy here is of a subordinate telling a supervisor what she is/is not capable of, or telling
the supervisor what she would need in order to carry out specic task at hand to achieve a specic outcome, or what
the possible outcomes actually would be for that specic task.
3.5.1 Common Approaches: e literature in this section can be split into two high-level categories. e rst set
deals with how an AIA can algorithmically account for its uncertainties in its models of its task, environment, operating
context, and capabilities. ese kinds of assurances help inform the predictability and situation normality aspects of
trust. e second set of methods aempt to algorithmically reduce complex ‘uninterpretable’ models or processes that
underlie AIA capabilities into more interpretable ones by providing explanations. Here the AIA makes an active aempt
at processing data and making information available to the user to inform the competency aspect of trust.
Accounting for Uncertainty: An AIA that can predict its performance on dierent tasks can provide assurances about
competence, predictability, and the situational normality of a given task. Several researchers have worked to improve
this ability in visual classication [25, 51, 66, 151]. For example, to ensure that visual classiers don’t fail silently in
novel scenarios, Zhang et al. [151] learned models of errors on training images to predict errors on test images. Kaipa
et al. [66] consider 3D visual classication of assembly line parts for robotic pick and place tasks, and develop statistical
goodness-of-t tests to estimate the likelihood that robots can use their sensors to nd parts matching desired ones.
ese approaches allow the AIA to assess capability and present appropriate assurances to users, though without any
formal notions of trust.
Mitchell et al. [99], discuss, in the context of a ‘never ending learning problem’ (i.e. where the AIA perpetually
learns over time), how an agent can quantify uncertainty on unlabeled data given three requirements: 1) three or more
approximations of a function are available, 2) the assumption that these functions are more accurate than chance, and
3) these functions have independent errors. e rates at which these functions agree on classication of unlabeled
examples can be used to solve for their exact accuracies. Doing this allows the system to actively reduce uncertainty,
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by seeking relevant data. In the context of image classication, Paul and Newman [108] introduced ‘perplexity’ as a
metric that represents uncertainty in predicting a single class and is used to select the ‘most perplexing’ images for
further learning. ere have also been several aempts to use Gaussian processes (GPs) to actively learn and assign
probabilistic classications [13, 31, 48, 49, 91, 131–133]. As with perplexity-based classiers, the key insight is that
if a classier possesses a measure of uncertainty, then that uncertainty can be used for ecient instance searching,
comparison, and learning, as well as reporting a measure of condence to users. e key property of GPs to this end is
their ability to produce output condence/uncertainty estimates that grow more uncertain away from the training data.
is information can be readily assessed and conveyed to users, even in high-dimensional problems. is property has
also found much use in other AIA active learning problems, e.g. Bayesian optimization [16, 63, 121].
Neural network (NN) models are commonly considered black-box models, and methods to represent uncertainty
have not historically been available. However, there have been several recent advances to make this possible to some
extent [42, 43]. Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) are a method by which we can draw insight about the uncertainty
of a neural network’s predictions; this is possible by placing prior distributions over the weights in a NN. Kendall
and Gal [70], in the context of computer vision, also use deep BNNs to help visualize epistemic (input) and aleatoric
(model) uncertainty for each pixel of an image. Similarly, Kahn et al. [65] use deep BNNs to learn about the probability
(with uncertainty) of an autonomous vehicle colliding in an environment given its current state, observations, and
sequence of controls. Using this model they formulate a ‘velocity-dependent collision cost’ that is used for model-
based reinforcement learning. In order to help predict uncertainty in real-time robotic applications that learn from
demonstrations, Choi et al. [24] use mixture density networks (MDNs)—neural networks that learn parameters of a
Gaussian mixture distribution—to model complex distributions from human demonstrations.
Models and logic are not trustworthy by themselves; they may be awed to begin with, or become invalid when
assumptions or specications are violated. us, there is great interest in providing assurances that the models and
assumptions underlying dierent AIA processes are in fact sound. Laskey [80]—with the intention of communicating
model validity to users of ‘probability-based decision aids’—notes that it is infeasible to perform a decision-theoretic
calculation to determine if model revision is necessary. She presents a class of theoretically justied model revision
indicators, based on the idea of constructing a computationally simple alternate model and then initiating model revision
if the likelihood ratio of the alternate model becomes too large (see also Habbema [54], Zagorecki et al. [149]). Ghosh
et al. [45] present ‘model repair’ and ‘data repair’ strategies that can be used when the current model does not match
the observed data, at which point the model and data can be repaired, and control actions can be replanned in order to
conform with the formal method specications. One challenge is how the ‘trustable’ constraints should be identied, as
this places a strong burden on the certifying authorities and system designer to foresee all possible failures.
Reduce Complexity. Representations within an AIA are oen complex. Sometimes using inherently less complex,
‘interpretable models’ (as discussed in 3.2), is the most straight forward way to address this challenge. However, in
some cases it is desirable to maintain complex, less interpretable representations (e.g. for performance reasons) and
then reduce the inherent complexities (possibly post-hoc) to aid human users.
One typical approach is to generate explanations, but how should explanations be provided? ere are also consid-
erations regarding whether explanations should occur by two-way interaction between system and user, by natural
language interaction, or by probabilities. Some of the answers to these questions lie more in the realm of cognitive
science. Still, natural language and other communication modalities could be used [58]. Specically, Olah et al. [104]
investigate how predictions of NNs can be explained through visualizing how dierent parts of the network respond
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to certain images. ey propose combining several dierent approaches to get a holistic view of the NN behavior.
Specically, they use feature visualization (what a neuron is looking for), and aribution (how it aects the output).
ere are several classes of explanations. Abdollahi and Nasraoui [2] propose three in the context of collaborative
ltering: ‘neighbor style’ (explanation based on examples from similar situations), ‘inuence style’ (present the most
inuential items that led to a certain model output), and ‘keyword style’ (identify common features between user
keywords, and content). Oe [105] and Ribeiro et al. [111] implement analagous ideas in the realm of safe ML and
interpreting classiers respectively. Huang et al. [59] use ‘algorithmic teaching’ (see [9]) as inspiration for helping
human users learn a robot’s true objectives. Algorithmic teaching involves having a model of a students learning
algorithm, and then presenting training examples to allow the student to learn a target model. In this case the ‘student’ is
the human user, and the ‘teacher’ is the robot that is trying to teach the human its own objective function by presenting
a set of (optimal) training examples. Here we would consider the robot’s training examples as assurances.
Another consideration is whether an explanation is meant to be descriptive or aimed at ensuring comprehension, as
well as whether explanations need to be on a macro or micro scale relative for parts of the Bayesian network (similar to
globally/locally interpretable learned models [115]). Lacave and Dı´ez [77] address the AIA reduction of complexity
from the perspective of explaining probabilistic inference in Bayesian networks—specically, how and why a Bayesian
network reaches a conclusion given some imputed evidence. ey present three properties of explanation: 1) content
(what to explain), 2) communication (how to explain), and 3) adaptation (how to adapt based on who the user is). Several
key points for designing assurances arise from considering the dierences between explaining evidence (i.e. data), the
model (i.e. the Bayesian network itself), or the reasoning (i.e. the inference process).
Aitken [5] propose a metric called ‘machine self-condence’ for providing users with beer insight into autonomous
decision making under uncertainty. is insight comes from breaking down the complex inuences of uncertainty
on the decision making process and presenting them to the user in a simple way. Self-condence is dened as the
machine’s own perception of its ability to carry out tasks in light of uncertainties in its knowledge of the world, its own
self/states, and its reasoning process and execution abilities. In this sense, self-condence is an AIA’s metacognitive
assessment of its own behavior and ‘competency boundaries’. A computational measure for POMDP-based autonomous
planning is dened from ve component assurances (which are fairly general and applicable to most other kinds of
planners): 1) Model Validity, 2) Expected Outcome Assessment, 3) Solver ality, 4) Interpretation of User Commands,
and 5) Past Performance. e key idea behind this set of measures is to assess where and when approximations required
for planning under uncertainty are expected to break down. Model validity aempts to quantify the validity of a model
within the current situation. e expected outcome assessment uses the distribution over rewards to indicate how
benecial or detrimental the outcome is likely to be. Solver quality quanties how a specic POMDP solver is likely to
perform in the given problem seing (i.e. how close to optimal the solution policy and approximate solution policy can
get). e interpretation of commands component is meant to quantify how well the objective has been interpreted
(i.e. how sure is the AIA that it correctly interpreted mission specications into relevant tasks and suitable goals).
Finally, past performance is meant to add in empirical experience from past missions, in order to make up for theoretical
oversights and account for learning-based processes.
Aitken [5] proposes that self-condence values could, for instance, be reported as a single value between −1 (complete
lack of condence in achieving mission objectives) and 1 (complete condence in achieving mission objectives); a
self-condence value of 0 reects total uncertainty. Each of the component assurances could be useful on its own, but
the composite ‘sum’ of the factors is meant to distill the information from the ve dierent areas, so that a (possibly
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novice) user can quickly and easily evaluate the ability of the AIA to perform in a given situation. Currently, only two
of the ve metrics (Expected Outcome Assessment, and Solver ality) have been developed quantitatively, but there is
continuing work on the other metrics and they plan to perform human experiments to evaluate the usefulness of the
self-condence metrics for AIAs. Other approaches for computing and communicating AIA self-condence have also
been proposed for more specic applications [61, 66, 75, 149].
3.5.2 Grounding Example: In the case of the ‘VIP Escort’ problem (described in Section 2.2), self-assessment might
be used as an assurance in the following way, starting with the assumptions that:
• e UGV is about to being an aempt to escape the road-network
• e UGV is using the ‘solver quality’ metric mentioned by Aitken et al. [6]
• e operator has access to an interface where they can view the self-condence metric calculated by the UGV
Before the UGV begins its aempt it is able to assess its ‘solver quality’ given the specic, previously unseen,
road-network based on similarities between the current network and ones that it has encountered before (i.e. problem
features that are important to determining the quality of the approximate solution produced by the policy). e UGV
reports that it has high condence in its solver quality, and the operator is assured that they can trust the solver in this
situation.
Discussion of Example: In this case the UGV is able to assure the operator of the quality of the solver in the
specic road-network. Generally, the UGV reduced what could be a very complex analysis into a simple format for the
operator to interpret. is is in contrast to the operator viewing policies, models, algorithms, and complex probability
distributions.
3.6 Information Visualization
We dene ‘information visualization’ as the act of displaying artifacts generated by AIA models or processes for the task
at hand in such a way as to communicate to one of the trust dimensions of a human user. Specically we consider the
‘competence’ and ‘predictability’ of the AIA, as well as the ‘situational normality’ of the task at hand. is can overlap
but is not necessarily the same as generating self-assessments, which are introspective and process based assurances (i.e.
which are descriptive and reective of the AIA’s capabilities); rather, information visualization tends to more broadly
include or revolve around outcome based assurances (i.e. which focus on results or expected results of applying the
AIA’s capabilities).
3.6.1 Common Approaches: Liu et al. [88] review several of the current methods that exist for visualizing machine
learning models. ey identied three main purposes for which visualizations are useful in this context: 1) understanding
(why models behave the way they do on certain problems), 2) diagnosis (failures, or unexpected behavior on certain
tasks), and 3) renement (ability to improve performance on tasks). We consider two common methods that assist in
these processes: dimensionality reduction and visualization of uncertainty.
Dimensionality Reduction: Dimensionality reduction (DR) is one of the key methods used in creating visualizations.
Sacha et al. [118] identify seven dierent methods by which users interact with DR techniques. ey use this to make
the human-in-the-loop process model for interactive DR that is shown in Figure 8. is interactive nature of their
model helps users to beer understand the information that they are viewing.
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Fig. 8. Human-in-the-loop process model [118] ©2017 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Sacha, Dominik, et al. “Visual Interaction
with Dimensionality Reduction: A Structured Literature Analysis.” IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics, vol.
23, no. 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 241-50.
Venna [138] discusses DR for ML and reviews many linear and non-linear projection methods. Vellido et al. [137] also
discusses the importance of DR for making ML models interpretable. As one example, Chipman and Gu [22] applied
this idea by constraining principle component analysis (PCA) in an aempt to make the resulting linear combinations
of variables more interpretable (more homogeneous, or more sparse).
At times a simple visualization is the most ecient way to communicate the results of decision making or planning.
For example: Chadalavada et al. [19] enable a robot to project its path onto the ground so users can see.
Treatment of Uncertainty: In the previous section we have already visited the importance of an AIA being able
to quantify its uncertainty. Visualization researchers are concerned with how to convey that uncertainty to human
users (and quantify uncertainty inherent in making visualizations). Sacha et al. [117] discuss how the propagation of
uncertainty through visual analytics systems can aect the trust of human users (see also [26]). One excellent example
of this is the work by Wu et al. [146], who create a tool to visualize the ow and propagation of uncertainty in the
visualization process. In this way users can understand where uncertainty enters the data visualization process.
e relationship between systemic uncertainties and their eects on system performance can be very complex.
Hutchins et al. [61] address this by using expert knowledge, and a ‘trust annunciator panel’ (TAP) that has several
‘uncertainty level indicators’ in order to display how uncertainties in sensors will eect the output quality, and the
mission impact; and the same for the planning algorithm (see Figure 9).
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Fig. 9. Proposed ‘trust annunciator panel’ [61] Hutchins, Andrew R., et al., Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
Annual Meeting, “Representing Autonomous Systems’ Self-Confidence through Competency Boundaries” Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 279-83.
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3.6.2 Grounding Example: In the case of the ‘VIP Escort’ problem (described in Section 2.2), information visualization
might be used as an assurance in the following way, starting with the assumptions that:
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• e UGV has just begun an aempt to escape the road-network
• e user has access to an interface like that proposed in [61]
During the aempt the user is able to see how the sensor uncertainty might possibly eect the outcome of the
mission. In this case, the user is assured that the sensors will have lile negative impact on the outcome of the mission
given the current weather conditions.
Discussion of Example: Here we see how a visualization is able to assist the user in correlating the eects between
sensor uncertainty and mission outcome. is is not a simple relationship for operators (especially untrained) to learn
on their own; even if they were able to learn the time required to do so can be very detrimental.
3.7 User Assessment
In this section we address assurances that are based solely on user assessment; in other words the AIA expends lile or
no computational eort to ‘digest data’ to turn into assurance information for the user, and instead relies the user’s own
cognitive abilities to draw assurances from their observations. Such assurances are clearly not integral to the function
of the AIA, as they might, for example, be realized by incorporating simple displays, print statements, or other ‘raw
data’ indicators into a basic user interface. is category is in contrast to Section 3.6, where the AIA is designed to
process data to assist the user in understanding how to trust the AIA appropriately. is approach is enticing for many
system designers given how easy it is to implement at any stage of AIA design (even as an aer-thought). However the
eectiveness of this approach rests on several, strong, assumptions:
• e user can form a ‘good enough’ mental model of the AIA on their own to inform appropriate TRBs;
• Dierent users have ‘similar enough’ capabilities and experiences to draw appropriate inferences on their own;
• ere are no other compelling sources of information that will confound the assurance;
• Common cognitive biases won’t interfere with the long-term operation/supervision of the system (e.g. recency,
framing or anchoring eects that skew user’s perception of non-linear changes in performance variables like
power/fuel consumption).
e weight of each of these assumptions relies heavily on the task to be performed, and the characteristics of the
typical users. For example, in situations with highly trained personnel (i.e. military, or manufacturing facility) all users
will have similar level of capability; thus ‘user assessment’ is a viable and eective solution. In other scenarios with
more diverse users and operating environments these assumptions begin to break down (i.e. mass market consumer
products).
3.7.1 Common Approaches: As suggested in the section’s name users can form assurances by any method of
perception. e most commonly investigated approaches are: simple, visual, ‘display of raw data’; and ‘by inspection’
performance-based assessment.
Display of Raw Data: Assurances associated with displaying AIA performance variables sound banal (e.g. ow rate
for an automated pump [102]), but they actually make use of a nuanced point: the displayed performance value actually
serves to inform the user’s own mental model of the trustworthiness of an AIA capability. at is, the user’s trust in the
AIA’s capability does not change only in response to the instantaneous ‘goodness/badness’ of the AIA’s performance,
but accounts for the past history of the AIA’s performance as well as any observed discrepancies between the AIA’s
expected behavior and its actual behavior. e user’s trust dimensions (‘competence’, ’predictability’, etc) are then
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aected by their perception of trustworthiness according to the combined model and data delivered by the display. is
approach (also noted and discussed by [61, 120, 144]) is eective, but relies heavily on the implicit assumption that the
user will create a ‘good enough statistical model’ of the AIA’s behavior from data presented by the AIA. With this in
mind, one might train a user to recognize signs of failure/success in dierent interactions with an AIA as assurances
[32, 39, 119]. e main drawback of this idea is that it still relies on users’ ability to construct ‘good enough’ mental
models of AIA behavior and characteristics from noisy observations to avoid misinterpreting AIA behaviors. It can
also require intensive and costly special eort for non-expert or non-specialist users. A more ideal approach in such
cases would be to design explicit assurances that help users construct correct/consistent mental process models of AIA
behavior and thus reduce the risk of misinterpretation.
Performance-based: Users can also be assured by directly assessing the performance of an AIA on their own without
any additional aiding or prompting. Put simply: making stu that (obviously) doesn’t break improves trust. Riley [113]
investigated how reliability and workload aected the participant’s likelihood of trusting in automation. Two simulated
environments were created to this end. First was for participants to use/not use an automated aid (with variable
reliability) to classify characters while also performing a distraction task. Interestingly, they found that pilots (those
with extensive experience working with automated systems) had a bias to use more automation, but reacted similarly
to students in the face of dynamic reliability changes.
In a similar vein Desai et al. [32] investigated the eects of robot reliability on the trust of human operators. In this
case, a human participant needed to work with an autonomous robot to search for victims in a building, while avoiding
obstacles. e operator had the ability to switch the robot from manual (teleoperated) mode, to semi-autonomous, or
autonomous mode depending on how they thought they could trust the system to perform. During this experiment the
reliability of the robot was changed in order to observe the eects on the operator’s reliance to the robot. Trust was
measured by the amount of time the robot spent in dierent levels of autonomy (i.e. manual vs. autonomous), and it
was found that trust changed based on the levels of reliability of the robot. Yu et al. [147] also had similar ndings in
their study of operators utilizing an ‘automatic quality monitor’.
3.7.2 Grounding Example: In the case of the ‘VIP Escort’ problem (described in Section 2.2), user assessment might
be used as an assurance in the following way, starting with the assumptions that:
• e UGV has just begun an aempt to escape the road-network
• e user can observe the location of the UGV on the road network
• e user has access to the speedometer of the UGV
• e user has been trained and understands how the UGV functions
As the user monitors the UGVs progress they notice that, on a particular stretch of road, the speedometer reading
seems very high, and the UGV stops moving. ey recall from training that in situations where the speedometer shows
a high speed and the UGV isn’t moving it is likely that the UGV is spinning out or high-centered. ey are able to
diagnose the failure and dispatch the appropriate assistance.
Discussion of Example: In this case the user was able to diagnose a problem based on the UGV not moving and the
speedometer being high. ey were able to do so because they were familiar with the system and were trained to be able
to recognize this kind of situation. In future interaction the user might associate the failure to certain characteristics of
the road, or other properties of the task. . .or just feel like the UGV isn’t very competent.
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4 FUTUREWORK
e formal design of algorithmic assurances is still an emerging eld. Consequently, there are many opportunities for
further research along dierent lines. is section outlines some possible promising directions for future work.
4.1 Properties of Assurances
Figure 4 gives some hints about how designers might be able to fully characterize the properties of AIA assurances. In
this survey we investigate, in some detail, ‘Level of Integration’. However all of the other grayed-out boxes in Figure 4
have open questions that should still be investigated.
Source-Target Classication: It would be especially convenient for designers of AIAs to be able to refer to assurances
by way of their source AIA capability (see Figure 2) and their target user trust dimension (see Figure 3). For example,
human-like gestures could be considered a ‘motion-predictability’ assurance. For instance, the reader may be able, in
retrospect, to identify work from [35] as a ‘motion-predictability’ assurance, while the work by Wang et al. [141] could
be considered to describe ‘perception-competence’ and ‘planning-predictability’ assurances (among others). Meanwhile,
Aitken et al. [6] considered a large set of assurances that span several source capabilities, and target trust dimensions.
However, it is not always easy to clearly separate AIA capabilities or trust dimensions due to the inherent cross-over.
Still, such classications are useful because dierent classes of algorithms will likely present themselves as useful in
applications for which assurances must target ‘predictability’ dimensions of trust, for example, as opposed to ‘situational
normality’. Given the inherent diculty of precisely modeling and measuring trust, it is not immediately clear how
such mappings can be precisely delineated. Future research might begin by looking for missing correspondences or
correlations in the literature for notional capability source-trust target pairs. For example, have satisfactory assurances
been developed for the ‘learning-situational-normality’ source-target pair? Or, to what extent (if any) can assurance x
for ‘perception-competence’ also be applied to ‘learning-competence’? Finally, are there certain classes of algorithms
that are suited for communicating to the ‘predictability’ dimension of trust, and can they be adapted from one AIA
capability to another?
Component and Composite: A component assurance is an assurance that describes a single AIA capability (or one
aspect of an AIA model/process for a capability), and targets one or more trust dimension targets. Component assurances
are the most well researched in the existing literature. A component assurance might include displaying the condence
of a classication prediction, or visualizing a model. A composite assurance is the combination of more than one
component assurance into a single assurance. A notable example is the machine self-condence work by Aitken [5]
which notionally combines ve component assurances into a single composite assurance interpretable to non-experts.
Figure 10 illustrates the concepts of component and composite assurances. Some open questions here are: how can
component assurances generally be combined to create a composite one? Also, to what extent can component and
composite assurances be used in concert to provide assurances for users of diering expertise? And, are the eects of a
composite assurance equal to the sum of its components?
Explicit and Implicit Assurances: is work has only considered designed algorithmic assurances. However, users will
always form some kind of trust relationship to an AIA, even if deliberately designed assurances are not available. In the
absence of designed assurances, user trust is informed by implicit undesigned assurances. ese can be thought of as
artifacts or side-eects of other design decisions not meant to directly inuence user trust.
Why is it important to consider implicit assurances? ere is always a danger that users aend to the ‘wrong’
assurances, i.e. AIA features that are not meant to be interpreted as assurances but are nevertheless easily perceived as
such (possibly more so than intended explicit assurances). For example, a designer may create a planning-predictability
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Fig. 10. Component vs. composite assurances: the combination of multiple component assurances into a single assurance is a
composite assurance. On the le are two component assurances a1 and a2; on the right only a3 aects the trust dimension.
assurance for an autonomous wheeled mobile robot, which could be rendered ineective by an implicit assurance given
by the appearance of that robot, e.g. the user may trust it less if the robot has old tires or has a large tool aached to its
front end which makes it ‘look unsafe’.
It remains an open question as to how designers can identify and mitigate the impact of implicit assurances, especially
so that they do not confound the intended eects of explicit assurances. User studies will undoubtedly be helpful
in obtaining feedback about which AIA characteristics most aect user trust, e.g. if explicit assurances are being
perceived, and if there are implicit assurances whose eects overwhelm those of explicitly designed assurances. With
such feedback, designers would have a realistic idea about whether their explicitly designed assurances are having the
desired eect on user TRBs. However, the design and analysis of this issue remains open for further study, and is likely
to have many application-specic dependencies (though, in the spirit of this paper, cross-domain comparisons would
also likely prove valuable).
Tutoring vs Telling: Assurances investigated to date are largely designed for one-way ‘telling’ of information, i.e. that
they do not consider and adapt to the experience or other traits of dierent users. e ability to adapt to dierent users,
and tutor them to appropriately trust AIAs will become more critical as time passes, due to the diversity of user bases for
advanced AIAs and time that users will spend interacting with them on complex tasks. A tutoring assurance might, for
example, be a planned dynamic sequence of assurances that would change in time to adapt to the user’s needs via two
way user-AIA communication. is might include modication of assurances to help a user avoid boredom or fatigue
in long-duration applications requiring user supervision, or to use the system dierently in varying circumstances. It is
not surprising that, to our knowledge, no research has been done with respect to tutoring a user in a trust relationship.
is is a complex problem that requires understanding how dierent users learn and identifying potential strategies for
eliciting appropriate TRBs from them. However, many interesting avenues for pursuing these ideas may come from the
work on educational tutoring systems [143] and algorithmic teaching [9].
4.2 Trust and Distrust
e treatment of assurances in this survey is based, in part, on a model of interpersonal trust. For completeness it
will be important to further investigate distrust, as reviewed and discussed by Lewicki et al. [82], and formalized in
McKnight and Chervany [93]. Low trust is not the same as distrust, and low distrust is not the same as trust. McKnight
and Chervany [93] suggest that ‘the emotional intensity of distrust distinguishes it from trust’, and they explain that
distrust comes from emotions like wariness, caution, and fear – whereas trust stems from emotions like hope, safety,
and condence. Trust and distrust are orthogonal elements that dene a person’s TRB towards a trustee. Since distrust
was not considered here, it is not clear to what extent the human-AIA trust model remains eective in the presence of
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user wariness, caution, or fear. estions for future work include: to what extent can behaviors driven by distrust
be isolated from those originating from trust? How can those behaviors be detected to begin with? And in what
circumstances is the extra eort necessary?
4.3 Human Limitations
Dealing with human users requires consideration of their cognitive limitations. For instance cognitive biases known as
‘framing eects’ (reacting to the same choice in dierent ways depending on how it is presented) will be important to
consider for designing usable AIAs that must make decisions under uncertainty [39, 113]. e existence of framing
eects are not surprising to those familiar with cognitive science, but they will likely be unanticipated phenomena to
many AIA system designers. Other related cognitive biases and limitations such as ‘recency eects’ (being biased in
making choices based on recent experience), ‘focusing eects’ (being biased in choice selection based on a single aspect
of a correlated event), or ‘normalcy biases’ (failure to consider situations which have never occurred before) are also
important to consider.
Besides cognitive biases, humans are also limited in their ability to understand certain kinds of information. Com-
munities that investigate how probabilistic and statistical explanations can be presented to humans will have many
insights that are relevant for AIA designers and assurance design [74, 89, 114, 124, 140]. But it is not immediately clear
what methods are most appropriate for application in assurance design, or how they might be applied. For instance, can
the AIA detect when cognitive limitations are eecting TRBs? What other user limitations need to be characterized?
4.4 Expression and Perception of Assurances
Although specic algorithms can be used to build the contents of assurances, it is also critical to consider the actual
communication of assurances. e expression (and subsequent perception) of an assurance involves considering
mediums, methods, and ecacy. e medium of an assurance includes the form in which it expressed, e.g. visually,
audibly, or otherwise. e method of expression includes for example using a plot, or a natural language phrase (which
could be text-based or speech-based, depending on the medium). Finally, the factors inuencing the ecacy of the
assurance must also be considered (e.g. consider using an audible assurance in a noisy environment). Humans generally
utilize dierent methods/mediums when communicating assurances to each other to maintain ecacy when potential
‘losses in transfer’ might occur. However, arguably the greatest challenge in using dierent mediums and methods is
not in their implementation, but in designing the ability to recognize and decide when they should be applied. Some
interesting questions are: In what circumstances are dierent methods most useful? And the same for mediums? How
can dierent methods/mediums be selected in order to maximize assurance ecacy while also taking into account that
using all possible combinations will not help the user? How, and to what extent, can AIAs assess the ecacy of an
assurance before, during, or aer operation?
4.5 Observing Eects of Assurances
Since assurances are meant to inuence TRBs, it is important to quantify these eects so that: 1) the AIA system
designer can understand how eective the assurances actually are; and 2) the AIA can evaluate the ecacy of its
assurances and adapt them as needed. To our knowledge, there has not been any work that enables an AIA to observe
user responses to assurances and then adapt behaviors appropriately (at least not in the trust cycle seing).
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ere are two known approaches to measuring the eects of assurances: gathering self-reported changes [67, 92,
102, 119, 144], and measuring changes in TRBs [8, 32, 39, 119, 145]. Measuring changes in TRBs is the more objective
approach generally speaking, but the choice between one method and the other depends on the application. Still, more
investigation is needed to identify the principles behind measuring the eects of assurances. Some interesting, yet
unanswered, questions include: are there some TRB measurement strategies that fare beer than others for particular
kinds of applications or assurances? In what ways, if any, do these methods need to be adapted to suit dierent kinds of
users? Is it possible to show that there are in fact causal relations from specic assurances to specic TRBs?
5 CONCLUSIONS
e issues of user trust in AIAs and appropriate deployment/use of AIAs have become very prominent. Assurances
are the method by which AIAs can inuence humans to trust and (more importantly) use them appropriately. We
have presented here a denition, case for, and survey of algorithmic assurances in the context of human-AIA trust
relationships. A formal treatment of this topic is necessary because the ecosystem of AIAs is evolving more rapidly
than ever before; consequently, previous informal approaches to designing algorithmic assurances are insucient.
is survey was performed, to some extent, from a standpoint of designing intelligent unmanned vehicle systems that
must work in concert with a human supervisor. However, the theoretical framework and categorization of assurances is
meant to be generally applicable to a broad range of AIAs. A major motivation for this survey was the observation that
there are many researchers in dierent but related domains such as human factors, robotics, machine learning, articial
intelligence, and others who are (unknowingly) working along dierent parts of the same human-AIA assurance
spectrum. It is important for members of each community to recognize this, so that research eorts can be methodically
organized to answer related open questions in this important area. Assurances have historically been ignored from a
practical standpoint, and are the least understood component of human-AIA trust relationships. ere have been many
researchers who have recognized the concepts behind assurances, but no detailed denitions have been given until now.
ere are three main contributions from this work: 1) we have drawn from multiple bodies of research in order to ll
in the missing details for the human-AIA trust cycle (Fig. 1) and to formally dene assurances within this cycle; 2) we
present a classication of assurances in Sec. 2.1; 3) we identify an ‘assurance integration continuum’ shown in Fig. 6.
On that continuum seven dierent classes of algorithms were identied. Practitioners can use these classes to select
and design assurances for AIAs. Given the material provided herein, those who design assurances should have the tools
required to approach design and future research from a solid theoretical foundation.
A nal important and sobering takeaway is that there is not a single ‘silver bullet’ algorithmic assurance that will
perform the best in all situations. Given enough time, it is quite possible that highly specialized assurances could be
designed for many situations. Even so, we warn that, for the research and design of assurances to be sustainable in the
current environment of fast-paced development of new technology, it is important to consider approaches that are as
principally grounded as possible, in order to be more easily used with yet-to-be-invented methods for implementing
various AIA capabilities. We have identied many future opportunities for research on AIA assurance design and their
inuence on human trust, and hope researchers will begin looking outside of their own disciplines to discover, design
and formally test new tools and ideas for assurance design and implementation. e framework presented here should
unify research eorts by providing a common taxonomy in relation to human-AIA trust relationships. We believe it will
help researchers see the eld from a larger perspective, classify the type of research they are performing, and consider
the greater implications of their work. e eld of algorithmic assurances has an abundance of avenues for new and
challenging research, and we encourage researchers to pursue them.
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